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Polish Crisis Management Act · drones

Drones and Poland’s Crisis Management Act: what critical infrastructure operators must do

Since 4 July 2026, an amended Crisis Management Act has been in force in Poland. It implements the EU CER Directive on the resilience of critical entities. It does not directly require counter-drone systems. It does require a current threat analysis and protection that is adequate to its results, and drones are now a threat that is hard to leave out of such an analysis. Below: what the law says, the deadlines and penalties, and how to document the threat from the air.

Law as at 16 November 2026 · Unofficial English summary, not legal advice

Film: the EU Critical Entities Resilience Directive (CER), which the Polish act implements, in 2:47 (no voice-over).

In short

  • The act: Act of 29 May 2026 amending the Crisis Management Act and certain other acts (ustawa o zmianie ustawy o zarządzaniu kryzysowym oraz niektórych innych ustaw, Journal of Laws 2026, item 815), published on 19 June 2026, in force since 4 July 2026.
  • Main duty: a critical infrastructure operator keeps a current threat analysis and puts in place measures adequate to its results (Article 6ze).
  • Counter-drone systems: the act does not list them as a mandatory part of protection. The operator decides what is adequate, based on the analysis.
  • Critical entities: a risk assessment at least every two years (Article 6zt), audits, incident reporting, fines of up to PLN 200,000 (Article 6zzr).
  • Jamming drones: allowed only in strictly defined cases, by a specialised armed security formation, after notifying the competent authorities (Article 6zj).

Who the amendment applies to

The rules cover two groups. The first is critical infrastructure operators: entities on the list of critical infrastructure kept by the Director of the Government Centre for Security (Rządowe Centrum Bezpieczeństwa, RCB). This includes, among others, energy and fuel supply, communications, transport, water supply and healthcare. The list is classified: the operator receives a notice of its entry, and the deadlines run from that notice.

The second group is critical entities within the meaning of the CER Directive. For them the act adds further duties: a security management system, risk assessment, audits and incident reporting.

Duties and deadlines for critical infrastructure operators

The key duty comes from Article 6ze: the operator keeps a current analysis of threats to its critical infrastructure and, based on it, puts in place adequate measures, including physical protection, technical safeguards, business continuity and cooperation with the security services and the RCB.

DutyDeadlineProvision
Appoint a coordinator and a deputy30 daysArt. 6zi(2)
Threat analysis6 months from receiving the notice of entry on the listArt. 6ze(2)
Measures adequate to the analysis6 months from completing the analysisArt. 6ze(3)
Statement that the protection documentation is ready (the documentation is classified)15 months from entry on the listArt. 6zf(4)–(5)
Annual reportby 31 MarchArt. 6zg(1)

When contracting for these measures, the operator must ask service providers for certificates or other documents confirming their competence and authorisations and, where the service involves access to classified information, for confirmation that they can protect it (Article 6ze(5)).

Critical entities: risk assessment, incidents and fines

A critical entity runs a security management system, assesses risk at least every two years (Article 6zt) and is subject to audits. It reports a significant incident within 24 hours (Article 6zv(1)(4)).

Fines are imposed by the authority competent for critical entities (Article 6zzr):

  • no risk assessment: up to PLN 100,000,
  • failure to implement organisational and technical measures or to protect critical infrastructure: PLN 15,000 to 150,000,
  • no audit, or failure to follow post-inspection recommendations: up to PLN 200,000.

What about the PLN 1 million fine?

Some materials about the amendment mention PLN 1,000,000. That fine concerns something else: the management board of an energy, fuel or gas company that persistently fails to meet its duties towards the critical infrastructure protection officer (Article 7a of the Act of 18 March 2010 on the special powers of the minister responsible for state assets, added by this amendment). It is not a fine for not having a counter-drone system.

Does the act require a counter-drone system?

Not directly. The act does not list drone detection or neutralisation systems as a mandatory part of protection. It does require the measures to be adequate to the threats identified in the analysis, and the analysis has to be kept up to date.

After drones violated Polish airspace in 2025, and with reports of drones over airports and infrastructure sites across Europe, a threat analysis that ignores threats from the air is hard to justify. It makes sense to assess them like any other threat: how serious it is for the specific site, what limits it today and what is missing.

It is also worth separating drone detection from drone neutralisation. Jamming, taking over and destroying drones are reserved for authorised bodies and strictly regulated.

Can an operator jam drones?

The amendment lets a critical infrastructure operator allow the use of drone jamming devices, but only under strict conditions (Article 6zj):

  1. First, it informs the minister responsible for internal affairs, the President of the Office of Electronic Communications (UKE) and the competent unit of the Ministry of National Defence that such devices may be used, with their technical parameters (paragraph 1).
  2. It may decide that their use is permitted only in the cases set out in the Aviation Law (Article 156ze), the Act on the protection of shipping and seaports or the Act on means of direct coercion and firearms, for as long as necessary, only by staff of a specialised armed security formation (specjalistyczna uzbrojona formacja ochronna), and with the impact on telecommunications services kept to a minimum (paragraph 2).
  3. After use, it promptly informs the same authorities (paragraph 3). The minister responsible for internal affairs and the Minister of National Defence may order it to stop (paragraphs 4 and 5).

For most sites this means the realistic first step is detection and documentation, not jamming.

How to document the threat from the air

The threat analysis and the protection documentation belong to the operator, and the documentation is classified. Reliable data for them can still be prepared. We suggest three steps:

  1. Measure the site’s environment before choosing a system. Interference with satellite navigation signals, obstacles, the sensors’ field of view and nearby activity (such as passing trains) decide what a detection system will actually see and how many false alarms it will raise. It is better to know this before buying than after.
  2. Describe the requirements from the measurements, without product names: what must be detected, where, with what confidence and in what conditions. Such a description fits the protection documentation and a procurement.
  3. Repeat the measurement for each risk assessment and audit. Conditions at a site change, and a record of the measurements shows what the decisions were based on.

How we work with operators

EÒLDÌON is a company from Gdańsk, Poland. We develop SIFRA, a continuous record of the conditions sensors work in, with the exact time of every measurement, and NETAR & AGÉN, counter-drone command and control in which a person decides every action (currently in testing).

For infrastructure operators we are preparing a site measurement with SIFRA. We start with the quality of satellite navigation signals, including signs of jamming, and with timing accuracy; further kinds of measurement are added in stages. The record stays on site and belongs to the operator. The measurement report is input to the threat analysis, risk assessment and audit: it does not replace them, and responsibility for protection stays with the operator.

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Frequently asked questions

Must a critical infrastructure operator buy a counter-drone system?

The act does not require it directly. It requires a threat analysis and measures adequate to its results. If the analysis identifies drones as a significant threat, protection against them becomes part of those adequate measures.

How does an operator know it is on the critical infrastructure list?

The list is kept by the Director of the Government Centre for Security and is classified. The operator receives a notice of its entry; among other things, the six-month deadline for the threat analysis runs from that notice.

What fines apply for missing protection?

Up to PLN 200,000 for critical entities, depending on the breach (Article 6zzr). The PLN 1,000,000 fine applies to management boards of energy, fuel and gas companies and concerns another matter: their duties towards the critical infrastructure protection officer.

Can a site jam drones on its own?

Only under Article 6zj: by a specialised armed security formation, in the cases set out in the relevant acts, after notifying the Ministry of the Interior and Administration, the President of UKE and the Ministry of National Defence beforehand, and informing them after use.

Law as at 16 November 2026. This is an unofficial English summary for information only and is not legal advice. The only binding text is the Polish act: Dz.U. 2026 poz. 815. For a specific case, please consult a lawyer. Wersja polska.